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   Locke’s	  claim	  that	  the	  primary	  signification	  of	  (most)	  words	  is	  an	  idea,	  or	  complex	   of	   ideas,	   has	   received	   different	   interpretations.	   I	   support	   the	  majority	   view	   that	   Locke’s	   notion	   of	   primary	   signification	   can	   be	  construed	  in	  terms	  of	  linguistic	  meaning.	  But	  this	  reading	  has	  been	  seen	  as	  making	   Locke’s	   account	   vulnerable	   to	   various	   criticisms,	   of	   which	   I	  consider	   two.	   First,	   it	   appears	   to	   make	   the	   account	   vulnerable	   to	   the	  charge	  that	  an	  idea	  cannot	  play	  the	  role	  that	  a	  word	  meaning	  should	  play.	  I	   argue	   that	   the	   role	   Locke	   actually	   gives	   to	   signified	   ideas	   is	   not	  susceptible	  to	  this	  criticism.	  Second,	  it	  appears	  to	  make	  Locke	  guilty	  of	  at	  least	  some	  degree	  of	  semantic	  idealism.	  I	  argue	  that	  Locke	  is	  not	  guilty	  of	  this	  and	  that	  he	  makes	  a	  proper	  distinction	  between	  the	  non-­‐referential	  relation	  that	  holds	  between	  a	  word	  and	  its	  primary	  signification	  and	  the	  referential	   relation	   that	   holds	   between	   a	   word	   and	   things	   the	   word	   is	  used	  to	  speak	  about.	  	  
	  
1.	  Introduction	  	  Locke’s	  claim	  that	  the	  primary	  signification	  of	  (most)	  words	  is	  an	  idea,	  or	  complex	  of	  ideas,	  has	   received	  different	   interpretations.	  Most	   theorists	   argue	   that	  by	  primary	  signification	  Locke	  has	  in	  mind	  ‘(linguistic)	  meaning’	  (e.g.	  Alston,	  1964;	  Kretzmann,	  1967;	   Losonsky,	   1994;	   2007;	   Yolton,	   1970).	   Some	   though	   have	   denied	   this.	  Ashworth	   (1981;	   1984)	   argues	   that	   signification	   relates,	   not	   to	   meaning,	   but	   to	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‘making	  something	  known’.	  Ott	  (2004:	  24)	  argues	  that	  the	  sign/signification	  relation	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  a	  sign	  being	  an	  ‘indicator’	  of	  (evidence	  for)	  what	  is	  signified.	  Against	  these	   latter	   theorists,	   I	   argue	   that	   something	   like	   linguistic	   meaning	   is	   almost	  certainly	  correct	  (section	  2).	  	  But	   this	   reading	   has	   been	   seen	   as	   making	   Locke’s	   account	   vulnerable	   to	  various	   criticisms,	   of	   which	   I	   consider	   two.	   First,	   it	   appears	   to	  make	   the	   account	  vulnerable	  to	  the	  charge	  that	  something	  like	  an	  idea	  cannot	  play	  the	  role	  that	  a	  word	  meaning	  should	  play.	  The	  concern	  is	  that	  an	  idea	  cannot	  determine	  whether	  or	  not	  a	  word	  applies	  to	  a	  particular	  object.	  In	  response,	  I	  argue	  that	  this	  is	  not	  the	  role	  that	  Locke	  gives	  to	  ideas.	  Locke	  describes	  a	  different	  role,	  one	  that	  is	  appropriate	  for	  his	  account	  of	  words	  (section	  3).	  Second,	  the	  account	  appears	  to	  make	  Locke	  guilty	  of	  at	  least	  some	  degree	  of	  semantic	  idealism,	  in	  which	  a	  word	  is	  taken	  to	  refer	  not	  only	  to	  things	  in	  the	  world	  but	  also	  to	  the	  ideas	  that	  a	  word	  signifies.	  Hence,	  when	  we	  say	  'The	  sun	  is	  the	  cause	  of	  the	  day'	  we	  are,	  in	  part,	  talking	  about	  our	  idea	  of	  the	  sun	  and	  our	   idea	   of	   a	   day.	   Losonsky	   (2007)	   accepts	   that	   this	   is	   a	   consequence	   of	   Locke's	  account.	   In	   a	   two-­‐part	   response	   to	   Losonsky,	   I	   argue	   that	   there	   is	   no	   need	   to	  suppose	   that	   any	   degree	   of	   semantic	   idealism	   is	   a	   consequence	   of	   the	   account	  (section	  4).	  	  	   	  
	  
2.	  Primary	  signification	  as	  word	  meaning	  	  Locke	  states	  that	  the	  proper/primary/immediate	  signification	  of	  a	  word	  is	  the	  idea	  (or	  ideas)	  that	  the	  word	  stands	  for	  (III.ii.1,	  2-­‐4,	  7;	  III.iv.1-­‐2).1	  Locke	  often	  omits	  the	  qualifiers	  and	  makes	  the	  same	  point	  in	  terms	  simply	  of	  the	  signification	  of	  a	  word.	  	   The	   textual	   support	   for	   the	   claim	   that	   Locke	   associates	   signification	   with	  word	  meaning	  is	  very	  strong.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  References	   to	   Locke’s	   Essay	   (Nidditch,	   1975)	   are	   given	   by	   book,	   chapter	   and	   section.	   I	   do	   not	  consider	   the	   type	   of	   word	   for	   which	   Locke	   would	   not	   propose	   an	   idea-­‐based	   account,	   such	   as	  connectives	  (III.vii.1-­‐6).	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Locke	   emphasizes	   that	   if	   a	  word	   does	   not	   stand	   for	   any	   idea	   that	  word	   is	  merely	   an	   empty	   sound.	   Words	   that	   belong	   to	   no	   idea	   ‘would	   be	   perfectly	  insignificant	   Sounds’	   (III.i.4),	   ‘bare	   Sounds,	   and	   nothing	   else’	   (III.x.26).	   The	   idea	   a	  word	  stands	  for	  is	  what	  is	  needed	  to	  make	  the	  difference	  between	  merely	  ‘articulate	  Sounds’,	   which	   even	   parrots	   can	   make,	   and	   a	   word	   of	   a	   language	   (III.i.1-­‐2).	   This	  corresponds	  to	  the	   intuition	  that	   it	   is	  when	  we	  have	   learnt	  the	  meaning	  of	  a	  word	  that	  the	  word	  becomes	  more	  for	  us	  than	  just	  a	  sound.	  A	  word	  for	  which	  ‘there	  are	  no	  determined	  Ideas’	  laid	  up	  in	  the	  user’s	  mind	  is	  a	  word	  ‘without	  any	  distinct	  meaning	  at	  all’	  (III.x.3).	  ‘He	  that	  hath	  Names	  without	  Ideas,	  wants	  meaning	  in	  his	  Words,	  and	  speaks	  only	  empty	  Sounds’	  (III.x.31).	  On	  this	  reading,	  the	  signification	  of	  a	  word	  is	  what	  makes	  a	  word	  significant,	   just	  as	  we	  might	  think	  of	  a	  word’s	  meaning	  as	  that	  which	  makes	  a	  word	  significant.	  	  In	   many	   passages	   we	   find	   the	   terms	   ‘meaning’	   and	   ‘signification’	   in	   close	  proximity.	   Losonsky	   (1994:	   124-­‐127),	  who	   summarizes	   the	   evidence,	   says	   that	   of	  sixty-­‐eight	  occurrences	  of	  ‘meaning’	  in	  the	  Essay	  sixty-­‐one	  of	  those	  occurrences	  are	  to	  what	  Locke	  in	  other	  places	  calls	  the	  ‘signification’	  of	  words.2	  To	  take	  just	  one	  type	  of	  example,	  Locke	  comments	  disparagingly	  on	  situations	  where	  people	  do	  not	  use	  words	  with	   the	   same	   significations	   as	   one	   another,	   and	  he	   alternatively	  describes	  this	  in	  terms	  of	  people	  using	  words	  in	  different	  meanings	  or	  senses	  (III.iv.15;	  III.ix.8;	  III.x.6;	  III.xi.25-­‐27).	  	  Further,	   Locke	   explicitly	   identifies	   signification	   with	   meaning	   when	   he	  discusses	   definitions.	   In	   a	   definition	   we	   use	   words	   to	   indicate	   the	   ideas	   that	  constitute	   the	   signification	   of	   the	   word	   that	   is	   being	   defined,	   and	   Locke	  straightforwardly	   describes	   a	   definition	   as	   ‘properly	   nothing	   but	   the	   shewing	   the	  meaning	  of	  one	  Word	  by	  several	  others’	  (III.iv.7):	  	  	  
[A]	   Definition	   is	   nothing	   else,	   but	   the	   shewing	   the	  meaning	   of	   one	  Word	   by	  
several	  other	  not	  synonymous	  Terms.	   The	  meaning	  of	  Words,	   being	  only	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Losonsky	   shows	   that	   the	   textual	   evidence	  points	  decisively	   against	  Ashworth’s	   (1984)	   claim	   that	  Locke	  only	  infrequently	  and	  casually	  links	  signification	  with	  meaning.	  
	   4	  
Ideas	  they	  are	  made	  to	  stand	  for,	  by	  him	  that	  uses	  them;	  the	  meaning	  of	  any	  Term	  is	  then	  shewed,	  or	  the	  Word	  is	  defined	  when	  by	  other	  Words,	  the	  Idea	  it	  is	  made	  the	  Sign	  of,	  and	  annexed	  to	  in	  the	  Mind	  of	  the	  Speaker,	  is	  as	  it	  were	  represented,	   or	   set	   before	   the	   view	   of	   another;	   and	   thus	   its	   Signification	  ascertained.	  (III.iv.6.	  See	  also	  III.iii.10;	  III.xi.17)	  	  Thus	  there	  is	  overwhelming	  evidence	  that	  the	  meaning	  and	  signification	  of	  a	  word	  are	   identical	   for	   Locke,	   ‘being	   only	   the	   Ideas	   they	   are	   made	   to	   stand	   for’	   (cf.	  Losonsky,	  1994:	  125;	  Yolton,	  1970:	  199).	   	  It	  is	  natural	  to	  think	  of	  a	  word	  as	  standing	  in	  a	  tight	  relation	  with	  its	  meaning.	  Locke’s	  language	  is	  often	  strongly	  suggestive	  of	  this.	  He	  uses	  certain	  descriptions	  for	  the	   relation	   of	   word	   to	   signified	   idea	   that	   he	   does	   not	   use,	   or	   almost	   never,	   to	  describe	   the	   relation	   between	   words	   and	   external	   things.	   Ideas	   are	   ‘affixed’	   to	   a	  name	   (II.xxii.5;	   III.iii.14;	   III.vi.51;	   III.x.3;	   III.xi.11;	   IV.viii.9;	   IV.xii.9);	   there	   is	   a	   close	  (or	   constant)	   ‘connexion’	   between	   idea	   and	   word	   (I.ii.23;	   II.xxxiii.19;	   III.ii.6-­‐8;	  III.iii.16);	  names	  and	  ideas	  are	  ‘annexed’	  to	  one	  another	  (frequently,	  see	  e.g.	  III.iii,	  vi,	  ix,	   x).3	  These	   descriptions	   are	   suggestive	   of	   a	   close	   bond.	   Locke	   also	   sketches	   an	  account	  of	  how	  this	  initial	  connection	  is	  put	  in	  place.	  By	  ‘attention	  and	  repetition’	  an	  idea,	  such	  as	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  colour	  or	  shape,	  can	  become	  fixed	  in	  our	  memory	  (II.x.3).	  Once	  such	  ideas	  are	  ‘lodged	  in	  the	  memory’,	  words	  can	  be	  ‘got	  to	  them’	  (I.ii.15).	  	  From	   this	   perspective,	   what	   a	   word	   (primarily)	   signifies	   is	   most	   naturally	  seen	   not	   as	   something	   to	   which	   the	   word	   refers	   but	   as	   relating	   to	   an	   initial	  connection,	  between	  word	  and	  idea,	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  in	  place	  before	  the	  word	  can	  be	  used	  to	  refer	  to	  things	  (cf.	  Guyer,	  1994:	  121;	  Kretzmann,	  1968:	  186f.;	  Soles,	  1988).	  If	  so,	  the	  primary	  signification	  of	  a	  word	  needs	  to	  be	  in	  place	  before	  we	  can	  use	  a	  word	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  ‘The	  term	  “annexed”	  is	  used	  fifty-­‐four	  times	  in	  Book	  III	  [of	  the	  Essay]	  and	  always	  in	  order	  to	  discuss	  the	  annexation	  of	  names’	  (Losonsky,	  2007:	  299	  note	  13).	  The	  only	  uses	  of	   'annexed'	  relating	  to	  the	  word-­‐thing	  relation	  are	  I.ii.23;	  III.vi.6	  (‘that	  which	  annexes	  [a	  parcel	  of	  Matter]	  …	  to	  the	  Species,	  is	  the	  nominal	  Essence’).	  Putative	  annexation	  to	  a	  real	  essence	  of	  a	  substance	  is	  mentioned	  at	  III.x.19.	  The	  only	  use	  of	  'connexion'	  for	  the	  word-­‐thing	  relation	  is	  III.iii.13	  (and	  IV.vi.5	  for	  putative	  connexion	  to	  a	  real	  essence	  of	  a	  substance).	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to	  make	   something	   known	   (Ashworth’s	   account	   of	   signification)	   or	   to	   indicate	   an	  idea	  that	  a	  person	  has	  (Ott’s	  account	  of	  signification).	  Losonsky	  (2007:	  296f.)	  makes	  this	  point	  against	  Ott	   and	   it	   applies	  equally	  against	  Ashworth:	   ‘it	   is	   the	   fact	   that	  a	  speaker	  uses	  a	  phrase	  that	  already	  has	  a	  certain	  meaning	  that	  makes	  it	  possible	  for	  that	  phrase	  to	  be	  evidence	  for	  what	  the	  speaker	  has	  in	  mind’	  (ibid.:	  297).	  	   Ott	  (2008:	  295)	  has	  responded	  to	  Losonsky	  by	  saying	  that	  ‘indicating’	  (Ott’s	  interpretation	   of	   signification)	   is	   not	   the	   same	   thing	   as	   ‘communicating’.	   Ott’s	  position	  seems	  to	  be	  that	  setting	  up	  the	  sign	  as	  an	  indicator	  of	  an	  idea	  is	  preliminary	  to	  using	  the	  sign	  to	  communicate	  that	  idea	  (cf.	  Ott,	  2004:	  26).	  If	  so,	  this	  parallels	  the	  preliminary	  status	  that	  I	  have	  suggested	  belongs	  to	  a	  word’s	  primary	  signification.	  But	  being	  an	   indicator	  of	   something	   is	  not,	   for	  Ott,	  properly	  described	   in	   terms	  of	  linguistic	   meaning.	   Ott	   illustrates	   from	   Hobbes	   what	   he	   means	   by	   an	   indicator.	  Hobbes	   states	   that	   things	   are	   ‘signs’	   when	   they	   are	   regularly	   observed	   either	   to	  follow	  something	  or	  to	  go	  before	  something.	  A	  thick	  cloud	  is	  a	  sign	  of	  rain	  to	  follow;	  rain	   is	   a	   sign	  of	   a	   thick	   cloud	   that	  went	  before.	  As	  well	   as	   these	  natural	   relations,	  signs	  can	  be	  set	  up	  arbitrarily.	  Hobbes	  writes:	  	   [A]	  bush	  hung	  up,	   signifies	   that	  wine	   is	   to	  be	   sold	   there;	   a	   stone	   set	   in	   the	  ground	  signifies	  the	  bound	  of	  a	  field;	  and	  words	  so	  and	  so	  connected,	  signify	  the	   cogitations	   and	  motions	   of	   our	   mind.	   (Hobbes,	  De	   Corpore	   I.ii.2.	   1839,	  14f.)	  	  From	   this	   perspective,	   what	   is	   signified	   is	   that	  which	   is	   indicated,	   that	   for	  which	  evidence	   is	   given	   (Ott	   2004:	   24).	   Ott	   (ibid.:	   28)	   allows	   that	   there	   is	   a	   notion	   of	  meaning	  that	  is	  consistent	  with	  indication:	  we	  can	  ask	  ‘What	  do	  the	  clouds	  mean?’,	  with	  ‘Rain’	  being	  an	  appropriate	  answer.	  The	  clouds	  indicate,	  reliably,	  the	  coming	  of	  rain.	   But,	  Ott	   claims,	   this	   notion	   of	   signification	   ‘is	   radically	   different	   from	   that	   of	  sense	   or	   reference,	   or	  making	   known,	   or	   expressing’	   (ibid.).	   Hence	   Ott	   wishes	   to	  separate	  signification	  from	  linguistic	  meaning.	  	   I	  doubt	  Ott’s	  position	  can	  be	  maintained.	  His	  notion	  of	  an	  indicator	  seems	  to	  presuppose	  reliability	  (made	  explicit	  2004:	  31f.):	  for	  x	  to	  indicate	  y,	  x	  must	  reliably	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correlate	   with	   y.	   But	   the	   reliable	   indication	   of	   such-­‐and-­‐such,	   in	   the	   context	   of	   a	  consideration	  of	  conventional	  signs,	   is	  most	  naturally	   taken	  as	  relating	  to	  how	  the	  conventional	  signs	  are	  used.	  If	  a	  community	  reliably	  uses	  a	  bush	  as	  a	  sign	  of	  a	  wine	  shop	  (and	  doesn’t	  use	  it	  as	  a	  sign	  for	  other	  shops),	  a	  bush	  outside	  a	  shop	  will	  be	  an	  indicator	   of,	   in	   the	   sense	   of	   reliable	   evidence	   for,	   a	   wine	   shop.	   Signs	   can	   be	  unreliably	   used.	   Signs	   that	   say	   ‘Trespassers	   will	   be	   prosecuted’	   do	   not	   reliably	  indicate	   that	   you	   will	   be	   prosecuted	   if	   you	   trespass;	   arguably,	   they	   do	   not	   even	  reliably	  indicate	  the	  ‘cogitations	  and	  motions’	  of	  the	  minds	  of	  the	  people	  who	  put	  up	  such	   signs	   (a	   more	   likely	   cogitation	   is,	   perhaps,	   ‘I	   hope	   this	   deters	   people’).	   But	  clearly	   it	   is	   also	   the	   case	   that	   the	   words,	   in	   spite	   of	   this,	   still	   have	   whatever	  meanings	   they	   have.	   From	   this	   use	   perspective,	   Ott’s	   position	   is	   vulnerable	   to	  Losonksy’s	   criticism:	   the	   type	   of	   signification	   Locke	   talks	   about	   seems	   to	   be	  something	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  in	  place	  before	  a	  use	  of	  the	  word	  can	  arise.	  	  If	   Ott	   does	   wish	   to	   give	   a	   more	   primary	   role	   to	   his	   interpretation	   of	  signification,	   it	   is	   hard	   to	   see	   how	   reliability	   can	   be	   part	   of	   the	   picture.	   The	  terminology	  of	  reliability	  does	  not	  seem	  appropriate	  for	  the	  initial	  relation	  between	  a	  word	  and	  its	  signification	  that	  is	  presupposed	  by	  the	  use	  of	  the	  word.	  Locke	  speaks	  of	  the	  idea	  that	  a	  word	  is	  ‘annexed	  to	  in	  the	  Mind	  of	  the	  Speaker’	  (III.iv.6);	  there	  is	  a	  ‘voluntary	   connexion’	   (III.iv.11)	   between	   word	   and	   idea.	   We	   need	   to	   reliably	  remember	  the	  connection,	  but	  the	  connection	  itself	  is	  not	  reliable	  or	  otherwise.	  A	  more	  general	  problem	  with	  Ott’s	  suggestion	  is	  that	  even	  if	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  trace	  a	  tradition	  of	  thought	  that	  treats	  signs	  as	  indicators	  it	  does	  not	  follow	  that	  this	  will	   provide	   an	   appropriate	   guide	   to	  Locke’s	   account	   of	   signification.	   Locke’s	   own	  discussion	   provides	   us	   with	   ample	   and	   detailed	   opportunity	   to	   discern	   what	   his	  account	  of	  signification	   is	  (cf.	  Losonsky,	  2007:	  296f.).	  We	  might	  compare	  this	  with	  how,	  when	  reading	  contemporary	  philosophers,	  the	  natural	  place	  to	  begin	  in	  order	  to	   interpret	  a	  semi-­‐technical	   term	  is	   to	  consider	  how	  the	  theorist	   in	  question	  uses	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the	   term,	   even	   when	   there	   has	   been	   extensive	   discussion	   of	   the	   term	   by	   other	  philosophers.4	  This	  point	  also	  applies	  to	  Ashworth’s	  (1981;	  1984)	  claim	  that	  the	  discussion	  of	  signify/signification	  by	  the	  scholastic	  philosophers	  of	  the	  late	  sixteenth	  and	  early	  seventeenth	   centuries	   gives	   us	   the	   key	   for	   interpreting	   Locke’s	   usage.	   She	   argues	  that	  the	  scholastic	  philosophers	  relate	  signification	  to	  what	  a	  word	  makes	  known	  or	  reveals. 5 	  If	   someone	   says	   ‘There	   is	   a	   burglar	   downstairs’,	   this	   might	   reveal	  something	  about	  a	  particular	  state	  of	  affairs	  (namely,	  there	  is	  a	  burglar	  downstairs)	  or,	  or	  in	  addition,	  it	  may	  reveal	  something	  about	  that	  person’s	  beliefs	  and	  thoughts.	  The	   scholastics	   debated	   whether	   it	   was	   thoughts	   or	   things	   that	   were	   primarily	  signified	  (see	  Ashworth,	  1981:	  309-­‐17;	  Dawson,	  2007:	  26-­‐9).	  Ashworth	  suggests	  we	  should	  read	  Locke	  in	  the	  context	  of	  this	  debate.	  Some	  argued	  that	  what	  we	  primarily	  pick	  up	  on,	  when	  we	  hear	  words,	  are	  statements	  about	  how	  the	  world	  is,	  and	  that	  it	  is	  only	  via	  those	  statements	  that	  we	  come	  to	  learn	  (if	  we	  do)	  of	  what	  the	  speaker	  is	  thinking.	   Others,	   such	   as	   the	   logician	   Burgersdijck,	   held	   that	   utterances	   primarily	  signify	   concepts,	   not	   things,	   and	   Ashworth	   claims	   that	   Locke	   ‘obviously	   followed’	  this	  second	  approach	  (1981:	  325).	  While	  this	  background	  may	  indicate	  something	  of	  the	  context	  in	  which	  Locke	  wrote,	   it	  does	  not	  follow	  that	   it	  provides	  the	  key	  to	  what	  Locke	  himself	  said	  about	  the	  signification	  of	  a	  word.	  An	   indication	   that	  Ashworth	  may	  be	  misreading	  Locke	  comes	   in	  her	  claim	  that	  Locke	  does	  not	  speak	  of	  signification	   in	   terms	  of	  meaning	  (or,	   if	   he	   does,	   Ashworth	   says	   it	   is	   only	   in	   a	   careless	   and	   casual	   manner).	   As	  discussed	  above,	  this	  claim	  is	  strongly	  refuted	  by	  the	  textual	  evidence.	  Locke’s	  own	  extensive	  discussion	  of	  signification	  can	  be	  taken	  as	  giving	  us	  a	  sure	  enough	  guide	  to	  his	  meaning.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  For	  example,	  Grice’s	  notion	  of	  ‘what	  is	  said’	  has	  been	  extensively	  discussed,	  but	  the	  only	  sure	  guide	  to	   interpreting	   a	   particular	   theorist’s	   use	   of	   this	   notion	   is	   by	   careful	   consideration	   of	   what	   the	  theorist	  writes.	  5	  See	  also	  Dawson	  (2007,	  chapter	  1)	  for	  discussion	  of	  this	  period.	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Ashworth’s	   discussion	   is	   in	   part	   influenced	   by	   her	   concern	   that	   Locke’s	  account	   fails	   to	   satisfy	   the	   basic	   requirements	   of	   a	   ‘theory	   of	   meaning’.	   In	   the	  following	  section	  I	  argue	  that	  Ashworth’s	  concerns	  are	  not	  necessary.	  	  
	  
3.	  The	  meaningful	  use	  of	  ideas	  	  One	   of	   Ashworth’s	   reasons	   for	   rejecting	   a	   ‘meaning’	   interpretation	   of	   Lockean	  signification	   is	   that	   she	   doesn’t	   think	   that	   ideas	   can	   play	   a	   particular	   type	   of	  meaning	  role.	  Ashworth	  refers	  to	  the	  kind	  of	  ‘theory	  of	  meaning’	  that	  is	  attributed	  to	  Locke	  ‘by	  Alston	  and	  others’	  (1984:	  64).	  Her	  explication	  of	  this	  approach	  to	  meaning	  is	  not	  clear	  but	  she	  does	  say	  that	  	  	   a	  theory	  of	  meaning	  is	  one	  which	  explains	  what	  type	  of	  entity	  it	  is	  that	  words	  are	   related	   to	   and	   which	   assigns	   a	   denotation	   to	   the	   referring	   phrases	   in	  question.	  (ibid.:	  53;	  cf.	  Alston,	  1964:	  16-­‐19)	  	  	  This	  indicates	  that	  by	  word	  meaning	  Ashworth	  is	  thinking	  of	  a	  putative	  entity	  that	  determines	  whether	  a	  word	  applies	  to	  a	  particular	  thing	  or	  not.	  An	   idea,	  arguably,	  cannot	  play	  this	  role,	  and	  I	  take	  Ashworth	  to	  be	  indicating	  this	  when	  she	  states	  that	  ‘[t]he	   presence	   of	   ideas	   as	   identifiable	   mental	   units	   is	   neither	   necessary	   nor	  sufficient	   for	   the	   meaningful	   use	   of	   language’	   (1984:	   54).	   This	   type	   of	   negative	  evaluation	   is	  well	  known	   in	  particular	   in	   relation	   to	  commentary	  on	  Wittgenstein.	  Both	  Kripke	  (1982:	  42)	  and	  C.	  McGinn	  (1984:	  119)	  refer	  to	  what	  they	  call	  the	  classic,	  or	  traditional,	  ‘empiricist’	  approach	  to	  word	  meaning,	  this	  being	  characterized	  as	  an	  account	   in	  which	  an	   image	  determines	  the	  meaning	  of	  a	  word	  (that	   is,	  determines	  what	   the	  word	   applies	   to).	   But	   a	   picture,	   or,	   indeed,	   any	   Lockean	   ‘idea’,	   does	   not	  really	  do	  anything	  by	  itself	  at	  all.	  If	  we	  consider	  a	  particular	  idea,	  and	  a	  given	  range	  of	  objects	  in	  the	  world,	  nothing	  is	  yet	  achieved	  with	  respect	  to	  determining	  which	  of	  those	  objects	  stand	  in	  the	  required	  ‘semantic’	  relation	  to	  the	  idea.	  More	  work	  needs	  to	  be	  done	  and	  this	  shows	  that	  an	  idea	  in	  itself	  is	  not	  capable	  of	  playing	  the	  meaning	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role,	  where	  that	  role	  is	  understood	  in	  terms	  of	  determining	  to	  which	  things	  a	  word	  applies.	  However,	   even	   allowing	   that	   ideas	   are	   limited	   in	   this	  way,	  we	   can	   still	   ask	  whether	  Locke	  is	  committed	  to	  this	  approach	  to	  the	  meaning	  role.	  I	  do	  not	  believe	  that	   this	   is	   the	   case.	   His	   account	   points	   to	   a	   different	   type	   of	   role,	   in	   which	   the	  requirement	  is	  that	  the	  ideational	  component	  is	  sufficient	  for	  enabling	  something	  to	  be	   conveyed	   by	   a	   use	   of	   the	   word.	   Losonsky	   (1994:	   130)	   seems	   to	   express	  something	   along	   these	   lines,	   speaking	   of	   a	   ‘minimal,	   pre-­‐theoretic	   conception	   of	  meaning’	   that	   can	   be	   characterized	   as:	   ‘meaning	   is	   whatever	   makes	   language	  intelligible	   to	  us	  as	  well	  as	  others’.	  There	   is	  no	  need	   to	  presuppose	   that	  what	   it	   is	  that	   makes	   a	   use	   of	   a	   word	   intelligible	   is	   something	   that	   has	   to	   play	   the	   role	   of	  providing	  a	  fully	  determinate	  application	  condition.	  Locke’s	  account	  shows	  a	  way	  in	  which	   an	   idea-­‐based	   approach	   to	   signification	   has	   the	   resources	   to	   provide	   an	  explanation	  of	  what	  it	  is	  that	  makes	  the	  use	  of	  some	  words	  intelligible.	  	  The	  first	  part	  of	  his	  account	  relates	  to	  our	  ability	  to	  remember	  such	  things	  as,	  for	   example,	   particular	   shapes	   and	   colours,	   whether	   these	   shapes	   or	   colours	   are	  those	  of	  particular	  things	  or	  are	  common	  to	  a	  group	  of	  things.	   Infants	  can	  observe	  ‘that	   there	   are	   a	   great	   many	   other	   Things	   in	   the	   world,	   that	   in	   some	   common	  agreements	   of	   Shape,	   and	   several	   other	   Qualities,	   resemble	   their	   Father	   and	  Mother’,	  and	  they	  thereby	  ‘frame	  an	  Idea,	  which	  they	  find	  those	  many	  Particulars	  do	  partake	   in	   …’	   (III.iii.7;	   for	   other	   shape	   examples,	   see	   III.v.13;	   III.vi.29;	   III.ix.15;	  III.xi.19,	  21).	  This	  ability,	  which	  we	  might	  think	  of	  (for	  a	  simple	  shape	  example)	   in	  terms	   of	   becoming	   aware	   of	   and	   memorizing	   a	   particular	   shape,	   is	   described	   by	  Locke	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  framing	  of	  an	  idea	  (abstracted	  from	  other	  ideas	  II.xi.9;	  III.iii.8-­‐9;	  III.iii.13).	  Once	  such	  an	  idea	  has	  been	  separated	  out	  from	  the	  wealth	  of	  perceptual	  inputs	  that	  we	  experience,	  we	  can	  store	  the	  idea	  in	  the	  mind.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  we	  can	  remember	  a	  particular	  shape	  (I.ii.15;	  II.x.2-­‐3;	  cf.	  I.ii.20).	  As	  well	  as	  shape,	  Locke	  also	  appeals	   to	   our	   ability	   to	   remember	   particular	   colours	   (II.xi.9;	   III.ii.3;	   III.vi.29;	  III.ix.15;	   III.xi.19)	   or	   tastes	   (III.iv.11)	   or	   sounds	   (III.v.13).	   Combinations	   of	   ideas,	  forming	   a	   complex	   idea,	   can	   likewise	   be	   ‘lodg’d	   in	   my	   Memory’	   (III.x.33).	   It	   is	  interesting	  to	  note	  here	  that	  an	  ability	  to	  focus	  on	  and	  remember	  particular	  features	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of	  our	  experience	  (cf.	  Locke’s	  discussion	  in	  II.x.1-­‐10)	  is	  very	  strongly	  supported	  by	  work	  in	  cognitive	  psychology.	  6	  Once	   an	   idea	   (or	   complex	   of	   ideas)	   has	   been	   remembered,	   it	   can	   be	  associated	  with	  a	  word.	   Ideas	  are	   ‘lodged	   in	   the	  Memory,	  and	  Names	  got	   to	   them’	  (I.ii.15;	  cf.	  III.ii.1;	  III.x.33).	  As	  noted	  in	  the	  previous	  section,	  Locke	  typically	  describes	  this	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  word	  as	  being	  ‘annexed’	  to	  an	  idea.	  Locke	   describes	   the	   remembered	   ideas	   (which	   capture	   particular	   features	  from	  our	  perceptual	  experience)	  as	  providing	  us	  with	  ‘patterns’	  that	  can	  be	  used	  for	  sorting	  things	  into	  types.	  Locke	  speaks	  of	  things	  as	  being	  found	  to	  ‘agree’	  with	  (or	  as	  ‘conforming’	   to)	   these	  patterns	   (II.xi.9;	   III.iii.6,	  8,	  13,	  15,	  18;	   III.vi.1,	  7,	  30,	  36,	  39).	  That	   is	   to	   say,	   having	  memorized	   a	   shape	   (or	   colour	   or	   texture,	   or	  whatever),	   on	  perceiving	   an	   object	   we	   can	   decide	   whether	   or	   not	   the	   object	   has	   that	   shape	   or	  colour	  or	  texture.	  When	  an	  object	  agrees	  with	  an	   idea	  the	  object	  can	  be	  named	  by	  the	  word	  (if	  there	  is	  one)	  that	  is	  annexed	  to	  the	  remembered	  idea	  (II.xi.9;	  III.iii.12-­‐13,	  15;	  III.vi.1;	  IV.vi.4).	  The	  picture	  suggested	  by	  this	  is	  that	  the	  memory	  of	  an	  idea	  or	  complex	  of	   ideas,	  which	  provides	  us	  with	  a	  kind	  of	  pattern,	   is	  a	  memory	  that	   is	  ultimately	   based	   on	   some	   repeatable	   configuration	   that	   arises	   in	   our	   experience.	  This	  could	  be	  derived	  from	  experience	  of	  a	  particular	  shape	  or	  colour,	  or	  it	  could	  be	  derived	   from	   a	   more	   complex	   type	   of	   basic	   experience	   (see	   for	   example	   Locke’s	  discussion	  of	   the	   ideas	  of	  power	  and	   succession,	   II.vii.8-­‐9,	   or	   solidity,	   II.iv.1).7	  The	  remembered	   configuration	   provides	   a	   ‘medium’	   (cf.	   III.iii.13)	   in	   terms	   of	  which	   a	  given	  perceptual	  experience	  can	  be	  classified	  depending	  on	  whether	  or	  not	  what	  is	  experienced	  (some	  particular	  object,	  for	  example)	  conforms	  to	  that	  pattern.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  L.	  Barsalou	  writes:	  ‘Once	  an	  aspect	  of	  perception	  has	  been	  selected,	  it	  has	  a	  very	  high	  likelihood	  of	  being	  stored	  in	  long-­‐term	  memory.	  On	  selecting	  the	  shape	  of	  an	  object,	  attention	  stores	  information	  about	   it.	  From	  decades	  of	  work	  on	  episodic	  memory,	   it	   is	  clear	  that	  where	  selective	  attention	  goes,	  long-­‐term	  storage	  follows,	  at	  least	  to	  a	  substantial	  extent’	  (1999:	  583).	  7	  Stuart	   (2008)	   notes	   that	   Locke's	   account	   of	   abstraction	   is	   limited	   in	   scope.	   But,	   as	   well	   as	  abstraction,	   Locke	   also,	   in	   practice,	   speaks	   in	   terms	   of	   particular	   patterns	   of	   interaction	   that	   we	  recognize	  as	  we	  experience	  objects	  over	  time.	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Several	  points	  can	  be	  made	  about	  this	  account.	  First,	  there	  may	  be	  a	  concern	  that	   the	   account	   points	   us	   to	   the	   perhaps	   implausible	   notion	   that	   the	   process	   of	  deciding	  whether	  or	  not	  something	  agrees	  with	  a	  pattern	  involves,	  at	  some	  stage,	  a	  conscious	  recall	  of	  the	  pattern	  itself.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  at	  some	  point	  we	  replay	  the	  idea	  that	  a	  word	  signifies	  to	  ourselves	  (maybe	  we	  inwardly	  picture	  a	  shape	  or	  colour,	  for	  example),	   and	   then	  make	   a	   conscious	   comparison	   between	   the	   replayed	   idea	   and	  something	  that	  we	  currently	  perceive.	  Locke	  himself	  possibly	  did	  think	  in	  terms	  of	  conscious	   recall	   and	   comparison.	   He	   speaks	   of	   words	   that	   ‘readily	   excite’	   and	  'revive'	   in	   us	   the	   ideas	   for	   which	   they	   stand	   (III.ii.6,	   8;	   IV.xviii.3),	   and	   describes	  ‘understanding’	   as	   including,	   as	   one	   of	   its	   parts,	   the	   ‘The	   Perception	   of	   the	  signification	   of	   Signs’,	   this	   standing	   prior	   to	   ‘The	   Perception	   of	   ...	   Agreement	   or	  Disagreement’	  (II.xxi.5;	  see	  Kretzmann,	  1968:	  192).8	  But	  in	  general	  this	  picture	  is	  an	  unlikely	  one.	  I	  can	  recognize	  a	  tune	  by	  virtue	  of	  having	  a	  memory	  of	  the	  tune;	  it	  does	  not	   follow	  that	  I	   first	  have	  to	   inwardly	  recall	   the	  tune	  and	  then	  compare	  that	  with	  what	  I	  hear.9	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  if	  I	  do	  not	  know	  the	  tune,	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  not	  having	  at	   some	   point	   heard	   and	  memorized	   it,	   I	  will	   not	   be	   able	   to	   recognize	   the	   tune.	   I	  suggest	   that	   the	   general	   framework	   of	   Locke’s	   account,	   with	   its	   reference	   to	  patterns	  and	  agreement,	  does	  not	   force	  us	   to	   suppose	   that	   the	  account	   requires	  a	  conscious	   recall	   of	   the	   idea	   associated	  with	   a	   particular	  word.	   No	   commitment	   is	  required	  here	  beyond	  the	  entirely	  plausible	  claim	  that	  we	  can	  remember	  features	  of	  things	  and,	  by	  virtue	  of	  that	  memory,	  make	  judgements	  as	  to	  what	  other	  things	  have	  those	  features.	  Neither,	   I	   suggest,	   is	   the	   account	   susceptible	   to	   Bennett’s	   (1972:	   13-­‐16)	  criticism	  that	  it	  explains	  our	  ability	  to	  classify	  objects	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  an	  unexplained	  ability	   to	   classify	   ideas.	   The	   particular	   idea	  we	   use	   to	   judge	  whether	   an	   object	   is	  horse-­‐shaped,	   for	   example,	   does	  not	   itself	   have	   to	  be	   located	  by	   first	  working	  out	  which	  of	  our	  shape	  memories	  is	  of	  the	  appropriate	  shape	  to	  be	  labelled	  the	  horse-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Berkeley	  in	  Alciphron	  VII	  criticizes	  the	  thought	  that	  each	  word	  must	  'suggest	  a	  distinct	  idea'	  to	  the	  hearer.	  Locke	  himself	  observes,	  though	  making	  a	  different	  point	  from	  Berkeley,	  that	  we	  often	  don't	  bother	  to	  formulate	  the	  idea	  fully	  to	  ourselves	  but	  make	  do	  just	  with	  the	  name	  (IV.v.4;	  IV.vi.1).	  	  9	  Though	  perhaps	  there	  are	  times	  when	  we	  do	  do	  something	  like	  that.	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shaped	   idea.	   Rather,	   all	   that	   is	   required	   is	   that	   we	   remember	   to	   what	   shape	   the	  word	   ‘horse’	   is	   annexed	   (cf.	  Ott,	   2004:	   69f.).	   The	   relation	  between	   a	  word	   and	   an	  object	   to	   which	   a	   word	   is	   applied	   is	   based,	   according	   to	   Locke’s	   account,	   on	   the	  object’s	   exhibiting	   the	   remembered	   pattern.	   This	   is	   different	   from	   the	   relation	  between	  a	  word	  and	  the	  word’s	  primary	  signification,	  which	  is	  based	  on	  setting	  up	  a	  connection,	  which	  has	  to	  be	  memorized,	  between	  the	  word	  and	  a	  particular	  idea.10	  Research	   into	   how	   children	   learn	   words	   for	   artifacts	   provides	   some	  interesting	   evidence	   for	   the	   plausibility	   of	   at	   least	   the	   basic	   outline	   of	   Locke’s	  account.	   Studies	   over	   the	   past	   twenty	   years	   have	   repeatedly	   shown	   that	   children	  can	  use	  simple	  cues,	  such	  as	  shape	  and	  texture,	  to	  guide	  their	  application	  of	  words	  to	  objects	  (e.g.	  Booth	  et	  al.,	  2005;	  Smith,	  2001).	  A	  child	  if	  shown	  an	  object	  (such	  as	  a	  tractor),	  and	  told	  its	  name	  (‘tractor’),	  may	  subsequently	  extend	  the	  word	  to	  further	  things	  by	  using	  the	  shape	  of	  the	  original	  object	  as	  a	  guide	  for	  applying	  the	  word	  to	  new	  objects.	  In	  Locke’s	  terms,	  the	  child	  stores	  an	  idea	  of	  the	  shape	  of	  the	  object	  in	  their	  mind,	   learns	   to	   connect	   a	  word	  with	   that	   idea,	   and	   then	   sorts	   things	   on	   the	  basis	   of	   whether	   or	   not	   the	   things	   conform	   to	   the	   pattern	   that	   has	   been	  remembered.	   Locke	   himself	   notes	   that,	   for	   substance	   words,	   reference	  merely	   to	  shape	   or	   colour	   can	   often	   ‘do	   well	   enough,	   to	   design	   the	   Things	   Men	   would	   be	  understood	  to	  speak	  of’	  (III.ix.15;	  cf.	  III.xi.19-­‐21),	  and	  that	  paring	  words	  with	  ‘little	  Draughts	   and	   Prints’	   can	   be	   a	   very	   effective	   way	   of	   teaching	   the	   signification	   of	  those	  substance	  words	  that	  stand	  for	  things	  ‘which	  are	  known	  and	  distinguished	  by	  their	   outward	   shapes’	   (III.xi.25).	   Locke	   suggests	   that	  when	  Adam	  was	   first	   shown	  gold,	  he	  abstracted	  just	  a	  few	  salient	  qualities,	  such	  as	  colour,	  weight,	  hardness,	  and	  annexed	  to	  them	  the	  name	  ‘gold’,	  thereby	  providing	  a	  basis	  for	  denominating	  things	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  A	  referee	  for	  this	  journal	  suggests	  that	  this	  misses	  Bennett’s	  point,	  which	  is	  that	  ‘to	  re-­‐identify	  is	  to	  classify:	  re-­‐identifying	  any	  enduring	  item	  A	  is	  classifying	  occasions	  as	  A-­‐encounters’	  (Bennett,	  1972:	  16).	   Whether	   a	   consistent	   response,	   involving	   recognition	   of	   sameness,	   to	   a	   given	   type	   of	  environmental	  input	  entails	  classification	  is	  surely	  open	  to	  question.	  But	  more	  to	  the	  point,	  Bennett	  appears	  to	  assume	  a	  questionable	  parallel	  between	  re-­‐identifying	  something	  and	  the	  kind	  of	  ability	  implicated	  in	  our	  ability	  to	  remember	  an	  idea	  (perhaps	  consider	  IV.i.4).	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as	  gold	  	  (III.vi.46-­‐7;	  cf.	  III.ii.3).11	  This	  is	  not	  a	  full	  account	  of	  a	  word’s	  signification	  (cf.	  III.vi.29-­‐30),	  but	   it	  does	  help	  bring	   to	   the	   fore	   the	  use	   that	   can	  be	  made	  of	   simple	  perceptual	  cues	  for	  guiding	  our	  use	  of	  at	  least	  some	  types	  of	  word.	  With	   Ashworth’s	   notion	   of	   meaning	   in	   mind,	   it	   is	   helpful	   to	   note	   that	   the	  account	   does	   not	   require	   that	   the	   remembered	   idea	   in	   itself	   determines	   to	   what	  objects	  the	  word	  applies.	  The	  criterion	  for	  ‘agreement’	  with	  a	  pattern	  is	  not	  going	  to	  be	   fully	   determinate.	   In	   general,	   it	   is	   easy	   to	   suspect	   that	   no	  pattern	  will	   have	   an	  entirely	   determinate	   relation	   to	   the	   objects	   that	   could	   plausibly	   be	   said	   to	   agree	  with	   the	   pattern.	   But	   this	   does	   not	   prevent	   something	   like	   a	   remembered	   shape	  from	  enabling	  a	  word	  to	  be	  used	  to	  communicate,	  hence	  as	  fulfilling	  Losonky’s	  pre-­‐theoretic	  suggestion	  that	  ‘meaning	  is	  whatever	  makes	  language	  intelligible	  to	  us	  as	  well	  as	  others’	   (1994:	  130).	  A	  child	  could	  say	   ‘There	   is	  a	   tractor	  coming	  down	  the	  road’,	   and	   thereby	   communicate	   something	   about	   how	   the	   world	   is,	   on	   the	  hypothesis	  that	  the	  child	  and	  the	  person	  spoken	  to	  both	  make	  use	  of	  a	  memory	  for	  a	  shape	  as	  a	  guide	  for	  applying	  the	  word	  ‘tractor’	  to	  objects	  in	  the	  world.	  	  	  
4.	  	  Does	  Locke	  think	  that	  words	  refer	  to	  ideas?12	  	  	  Losonsky	   (1994;	   2007)	   supports	   the	   claim	   that	   Locke’s	   account	   of	   primary	  signification	  relates	  to	  linguistic	  meaning.	  But	  Losonsky	  also	  argues	  that	  Locke	  is,	  to	  some	  degree,	  guilty	  of	  the	  charge	  of	  semantic	  idealism,	  in	  which	  words	  are	  treated	  as	   referring	   (in	   part)	   to	   the	   ideas	   they	   signify.	   Mill	   criticized	   the	   way	   in	   which	  Locke's	  account	  seems	  to	  make	  ideas,	  rather	  than	  things,	  the	  referents	  of	  our	  words:	  'When	   I	   say,	   "the	   sun	   is	   the	   cause	   of	   day",	   I	   do	  not	  mean	   that	  my	   idea	   of	   the	   sun	  causes	  or	  excites	  in	  me	  the	  idea	  of	  day'	  (System	  of	  Logic	  1.2.1).	  Losonsky	  argues	  that	  Mill	   overstates	  his	   case	   and	   that	   Locke	  does	  not	   suppose	   that	  words	   refer	  only	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Thanks	  to	  a	  referee	  for	  this	  journal	  for	  providing	  this	  reference.	  12	  This	  section	  has	  profited	  considerably	  from	  the	  criticisms	  that	  a	  referee	  for	  this	  journal	  had	  of	  an	  earlier	  version.	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ideas;	   they	   also	   refer	   to	   external	   things	   (2007:	  310).	  But	  Losonsky	   agrees	   that,	   in	  addition,	  part	  of	  the	  meaning	  Locke	  would	  assign	  to	  ‘the	  sun	  is	  the	  cause	  of	  the	  day’	  is	  ideational	  in	  focus:	  	  	   [T]he	   proper	   Lockean	   paraphrase	   is	   that	  what	   I	  mean,	   in	   part,	  when	   I	   say	  "The	  sun	  causes	  the	  day"	   is	  that	  my	  idea	  of	  sun	  is	  regularly	  connected	  with	  the	   idea	  of	  day,	  which	   is	  more	  plausible	   than	  Mill's	   incomplete	  paraphrase.	  (2007:	  311)	  	  Losonsky	   argues	   that	   while	   this	   element	   of	   semantic	   idealism	   is	   indeed	   part	   of	  Locke's	   account,	   and	   does	   reflect	   some	   confusion,	   this	   is	   not	   necessarily	   a	   totally	  absurd	  feature	  as	  long	  as	  we	  construe	  it	  in	  this	  appropriately	  qualified	  way	  (2007:	  311).	  	  	  	   Losonsky's	   argument	   for	   an	   element	   of	   semantic	   idealism	   in	   Locke	   is	  summarized	  in	  the	  following	  passage:	  	   Locke	  himself	  simply	  does	  not	  distinguish	  between	  sense	  and	  reference,	  and	  consequently	   Locke	   cannot	   be	   absolved	   fully	   of	   the	   charge	   of	   semantic	  idealism.	  After	  all,	  Locke	  does	  state	  quite	  simply	  that	  “Words	  …	  are	  names	  of	  
Ideas”	  or	  “referr”	  to	  ideas.	  (ibid.:	  310)	  	  I	  will	  break	  this	  down	  into	  two	  types	  of	  claim,	  one	  relating	  to	  Locke’s	  use	  of	  ‘referr’	  (section	  4.1),	  the	  other	  relating	  to	  Locke's	  description	  of	  words	  as	  'names	  of	  ideas'	  (section	  4.2).	   I	  will	  argue	  that	  neither	   type	  of	  evidence	  provides	  adequate	  support	  for	  the	  claim	  that	  Locke	  is	  guilty	  of	  a	  degree	  of	  semantic	  idealism.	  	  
4.1	  Locke's	  use	  of	  'refer'	  	  Losonksy	  appeals	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  Locke	  ‘does	  state	  quite	  simply’	  that	  words	  ‘refer’	  to	  ideas	   (he	   cites	   II.xxxi.6	   and	   III.iv.17),	   but	   this	   is	   misleading.	   Locke	   typically	   uses	  ‘refer’	   in	   ways	   that	   do	   not	   correspond	   to	   the	   notion	   of	   reference	   that	   would	   be	  
	   15	  
relevant	   for	   the	  charge	  of	   semantic	   idealism.	  An	   initial	  hint	   that	  his	  usage	   is	  often	  importantly	  different	  is	  that	  while	  the	  interpretation	  required	  for	  semantic	  idealism	  is	  typically	  phrased	  with	  an	  intransitive	  use	  of	   ‘refer’	  (words/people	  refer	  to	  such-­‐and-­‐such),	  Locke	  mostly	  uses	  ‘refer’	  in	  a	  transitive	  sense	  (an	  agent	  refers	  something	  to	  such-­‐and-­‐such).	  For	  example,	  he	  uses	  ‘refer’	  in	  the	  sense	  ‘to	  submit	  …	  to	  a	  higher	  authority	   for	   consideration’	   (OED):	   ‘The	   Painter	   agreed	   to	   refer	   himself	   to	   the	  Judgment	  of	  a	  blind	  Man’	   (III.iv.12);	   there	  are	   ‘Laws	  that	  Men	  generally	  refer	   their	  Actions	  to,	  to	  judge	  of	  their	  Rectitude,	  or	  Obliquity’	  (II.xxviii.7).	  	  	  The	  main	  sense	  in	  which	  Locke	  uses	  ‘refer’	  falls	  under	  the	  broad	  paraphrase	  given	   by	   the	   OED	   as:	   to	   relate	   one	   thing	   to	   another.	   Several	   different	   nuances	   of	  meaning	   (not	   always	   easily	   separable)	   fall	   under	   this	   general	   paraphrase.	   One	   of	  these	  nuances	  is	   ‘to	  trace	  (back),	  assign,	  attribute,	   impute	  (something)	  to	  a	  person	  or	  thing	  as	  the	  ultimate	  cause	  or	  source’	  (OED).	  This	  seems	  particularly	  applicable	  to	  Locke's	   discussion	   of	   mixed	   modes,	   where	   he	   writes	   that	   apart	   from	   ‘Men’s	  voluntary	   Combinations’	   we	   ‘have	   nothing	   else	   to	   refer	   these	   our	   Ideas	   of	   mixed	  Modes	   to	   as	   a	   Standard’	   (II.xxxii.12;	   see	   also	   II.xxxi.1,	   3;	   III.v.6;	   III.v.12;	   III.v.14;	  III.xi.17;	   IV.iv.5).	   Mixed	   modes	   are	   combinations	   of	   ideas	   that	   the	   mind	   has	  arbitrarily	   put	   together	   ‘without	   reference	   to	   any	   Archetypes’	   (III.xi.15),	   ‘without	  Patterns,	   or	   reference	   to	   any	   real	   Existence’	   (III.v.3).	   In	   these	   passages	   Locke	   is	  describing	   the	   lack	   of	   relatedness	   that	   mixed	  modes	   have	   to	   any	   archetype;	   that	  which	  we	  ‘refer'	  our	  ideas	  of	  mixed	  modes	  to	  -­‐	  that	  which	  we	  trace	  them	  back	  to	  -­‐	  consists	  of	  our	  own	  voluntary	  combinations	  of	   ideas,	  these	  being	  the	  source	  of	  the	  complex	   idea.	   By	   contrast,	   ‘Our	   complex	   Ideas	   of	   Substances,	   [are]	   …	   referred	   to	  
Patterns	   in	  Things	   themselves’	   (II.xxxii.18;	   cf.	   III.ix.20;	   IV.iv.11).	   That	   is	   to	   say,	   our	  ideas	  of	  substances	  are	  put	  together	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  how	  we	  experience	  things	  to	  be	  (and	  so	  are	  subject	  to	  modification	  as	  we	  learn	  more	  about	  things,	  III.vi.29-­‐30).	  	   A	   further	   nuance	   to	   the	   general	   sense	   to	   relate	   one	   thing	   to	   another	   is	   'to	  regard	  or	  classify	  as	  naturally	  belonging	  to	  or	  relating	  to'	  (OED).	  This	  nuance	  seems	  particularly	   relevant	   in	   several	   passages	  where	   Locke	   describes	   different	  ways	   in	  which	  people	  make	  questionable	  assumptions	  about	  the	  relation	  that	  holds	  between	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words	  and	  ideas	  (or	  external	  things).13	  He	  speaks	  of	  people	  as	  giving	  words	  ‘secret’	  or	   'tacit'	  references	  (II.xxix.10;	   II.xxx.1;	   III.ii.4;	   III.x.19),	  meaning	  something	   like	  an	  unexpressed	   supposition	   that	   a	   particular	   word-­‐idea	   (or	   word-­‐thing)	   relatedness	  holds.	  The	  sense	  once	  again	  is	  transitive,	  indicating	  an	  act	  of	  the	  mind	  in	  which	  two	  things	  are	  treated	  as	  related.	  In	  each	  case	  Locke	  suggests	  that	  there	  are	  grounds	  for	  doubting	  the	  relation.	  	   One	   example	   of	   this	   relates	   to	   Locke’s	   wish	   to	   emphasize	   that	   we	   cannot	  simply	   assume	   that	  we	   use	  words	  with	   the	   same	  meanings	   that	   other	   people	   use	  them	  with	  (see	  Guyer,	  1994).	  Locke	  describes	  this	  assumption	  in	  terms	  of	  giving	  a	  word	  a	  (secret)	  'reference'	  to	  some	  other	  thing	  (III.ii.4),	  that	  is,	  to	  some	  other	  thing	  than	   the	   particular	   idea	   that	   the	   speaker	   has	   in	   their	   own	  mind	   (cf.	   III.ii.2).	   This	  secret	   reference	   is	   glossed	   as	   how	   people	   ‘suppose	   their	  Words	   to	  be	  Marks	  of	   the	  Ideas	  in	  the	  Minds	  also	  of	  other	  Men'	  (III.ii.4;	  on	  this	  supposition	  see	  also	  II.xxxii.10;	  III.x.22).	   Locke	   can	   also	   describe	   this	   (with	   ideas,	   not	   words,	   the	   things	   being	  referred)	  as	  when	  ‘the	  Mind	  refers	  any	  of	  its	  Ideas	  to	  any	  thing	  extraneous	  to	  them’	  (II.xxxii.4),	  this	  being	  explained	  as	  	  	   [w]hen	  the	  Mind	  supposes	  any	  Idea	  it	  has,	  conformable	  to	  that	  in	  other	  Men’s	  Minds	   called	   by	   the	   same	   common	   Name;	   v.g.	   when	   the	   Mind	   intends,	   or	  judges	   its	   Ideas	   of	   Justice,	  Temperance,	  Religion,	   to	   be	   the	   same,	  with	  what	  other	  Men	  give	  those	  Names	  to.	  (II.xxxii.5)	  	  Locke’s	   immediate	  point	  here	  (see	  II.xxxii.4,	  10)	   is	  that	  the	  possibility	  of	  truth	  and	  falsity	  with	  respect	  to	   ideas	  (or,	   the	  condition	  for	   ideas	  to	  be	   ‘confused’,	   II.xxix.10-­‐12)	  only	  comes	  into	  play	  when	  particular	  links	  are	  assumed	  to	  hold	  between	  an	  idea	  and	  a	  given	  word.	  It	  is	  the	  supposing	  or	  intending	  of	  such	  links	  that	  is	  indicated	  by	  saying	   that	   the	   mind	   (tacitly)	   refers	   words	   to	   ideas	   or	   ideas	   to	   words	   (for	   this	  converse	   statement,	   see	   II.xxix.10;	   it	   is	   more	   or	   less	   implied	   in	   II.xxxii.5	   quoted	  above).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  Thanks	  to	  a	  referee	  for	  this	  journal	  for	  pointing	  out	  that	  I	  need	  to	  account	  for	  these	  passages.	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   A	  second	  example	  of	  how	  the	  mind	  gives	  words	   ‘a	  secret	  reference	  to	  other	  things’	  (other	  than	  our	  own	  ideas)	  is	  that	  of	  how	  people	  ‘often	  suppose	  their	  Words	  
to	  stand	  also	  for	  the	  reality	  of	  Things’	   (III.ii.5).	  Parallel	  passages	  (III.x.14-­‐16,	  25,	  30;	  cf.	   II.xxxii.5)	  suggest	  that	  the	  concern	  is	  with	  the	  tendency	  people	  have	  to	  suppose	  that	  just	  because	  a	  general	  term	  is	  in	  common	  use	  some	  aspect	  of	  the	  external	  world	  can	  therefore	  be	  taken	  for	  granted	  to	  correspond	  to	  the	  term.	  Locke	  describes	  this	  as	   a	   'great	  abuse	  of	  Words',	   the	   'taking	   them	   for	  Things',	  which	   he	   explains	   as	   the	  unfounded	   supposition	   that	   terms	   such	   as	   'vegetative	   soul'	   are	   'conformable	   to	  Nature,	   and	  are	   the	  Representations	  of	   something	   that	   really	   exists'	   (III.x.14).	  The	  fact	   that	   a	   given	  word	   is	   in	   use,	   annexed	   to	   an	   idea,	   does	   not	   in	   itself	   show	   that	  anything	  in	  reality	  conforms	  to	  that	  idea.	  But	  this	  is	  the	  supposition	  people	  tend	  to	  make	  and	  it	   is	  this	  that	  Locke	  can	  describe	  as	  the	  making	  of	  a	   ‘secret	  reference’	  to	  another	  thing.	  	  A	  third	  example	  (not	  clearly	  indicated	  in	  III.ii.4-­‐5,	  but	  see	  II.xxxi.6-­‐7;	  III.vi.49;	  III.ix.11-­‐12;	   III.x.17-­‐19;	   IV.vi.4;	   cf.	   II.xxxii.4-­‐6)	   is	   where	   the	   mind	   tacitly	   refers	   a	  substance	  word	  to	  a	  ‘real	  essence’.	  The	  concern	  here	  seems	  to	  be	  that	  people	  often	  use	   their	   substance	   words	   with	   the	   supposition	   that	   the	   word	   relates	   to	   a	   real	  essence,	   an	   essence	   that	   they	   suppose	   accounts	   for	   why	   a	   thing	   belongs	   to	   a	  particular	   sort	   (II.xxxi.7;	   for	   nominal	   essence	   as	   the	   basis	   for	   sorting	   things	   into	  substances,	  see	  III.vi.7,	  27ff.)	  We	  cannot	  have	  any	  idea	  of	  a	  supposed	  real	  essence	  of	  a	   substance	   (II.xxxi.6;	   III.iii.17;	   III.vi.22,	   49;	   III.x.17-­‐19);	   hence	   the	   (tacit)	   act	   in	  which	  the	  mind	  ‘refers'	  a	  substance	  word	  to	  such	  an	  essence	  is	  chimerical	  (II.xxx.1;	  cf.	  III.ii.2).14	  We	  cannot	  relate	  a	  word	  to	  something	  else	  when	  that	  something	  else	  is	  a	  putative	  essence	  of	  which	  we	  can	  have	  no	  ideas	  at	  all.15	  	   In	  the	  examples	  given	  so	  far,	  the	  typical	  phrasing	  is	  ‘the	  mind	  refers	  words	  to	  such-­‐and-­‐such’	   or,	   in	   the	   passive,	   ‘words	   are	   referred	   to	   such-­‐and-­‐such’.	   The	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  This	   is	   the	   context	   for	   some	   of	   Locke’s	   statements	   that	   words	   signify	   ‘nothing	   but’	   our	   ideas	  (II.xxxi.6;	   III.ii.4-­‐5;	   III.iv.1;	   cf.	   IV.vi.4),	   suggesting	   that	   these	   statements	   are	   aimed	   against	   the	  supposition	  that	  a	  word	  can	  stand	  for	  that	  of	  which	  we	  have	  no	  idea	  at	  all.	  	  15	  A	  further	  nuance	  of	  'refer'	  is	  'to	  bring	  into	  relation	  with’:	  'The	  nature	   ...	  of	  Relation,	  consists	  in	  the	  referring,	  or	  comparing	  two	  things,	  one	  to	  another'	  (II.xxv.5;	  see	  also	  II.xxviii.1,	  3).	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transitive	  form	  conveys	  a	  sense	  in	  which	  two	  different	  things	  are	  being	  considered,	  in	  the	  referring,	  as	  related	  one	  to	  the	  other.	  There	  are	  though	  a	  few	  passages	  where	  we	  find	  an	  intransitive	  use	  of	  ‘refer’.	  As	  far	  as	  I	  can	  tell	  these	  are	  limited	  to	  II.xxv.4;	  II.xxvii.1;	  II.xxviii.6;	  II.xxxi.5;	  III.iv.17;	  III.v.12;	  III.vi.22.	  But	  even	  here	  we	  do	  not	  find	  clear	  examples	  of	  a	  use	  of	  ‘refer’	  that	  matches	  the	  sense	  relevant	  to	  establishing	  the	  charge	  of	  semantic	  idealism.	  For	  example:	  ‘the	  notion	  of	  a	  Father	  …	  refers	  only	  to	  an	  act	  of	  that	  thing	  called	  Man’	  II.xxv.4.	  A	  natural	  reading	  for	  ‘refer’	  here	  is	  something	  like	   ‘to	  be	  concerned	  with’	   rather	   than	   ‘designates’	   (both	   these	   intransitive	  senses	  are	  given	  by	  the	  OED),	  and	  the	  same	  holds	  for	  II.xxvii.1	  and	  II.xxxi.5.	  	  An	  instructive	  example	  is	  given	  in	  III.vi.22:	  	   There	  are	  Creatures	   in	  the	  World,	   that	  have	  shapes	   like	  ours,	  but	  are	  hairy,	  and	  want	  Language,	  and	  Reason.	  …	  If	  it	  be	  asked,	  whether	  these	  be	  all	  Men,	  or	  no,	   all	   of	   human	  Species;	   ’tis	   plain,	   the	  Question	   refers	   only	   to	   the	  nominal	  Essence.	  	  Perhaps	   this	   is	   open	   to	   an	   interpretation	   in	   which	   Locke	   is	   taking	   the	   question	  ‘whether	   these	   be	   all	  Men’	   to	   be	   a	   question	   not	   about	   whether	   those	   creatures	  belong	  to	  a	  particular	  sort	  but	  as	  (only?)	  about	  the	  complex	  idea	  that	  constitutes	  the	  nominal	   essence	   (on	   nominal	   essence	   see	   III.iii.12-­‐15).	   But	   the	   natural	  interpretation,	   one	   that	   also	   fits	   the	   context,	   is	   one	   in	   which	   Locke	   is	   making	   a	  contrast	  between	  two	  possible	  foundations	  -­‐	  nominal	  essence	  or	  'the	  supposed	  real	  Essence'	   (III.vi.22)	   -­‐	   for	   establishing	   what	   sort	   an	   item	   belongs	   to.	   The	   question	  ‘whether	   these	   be	   all	   Men’	   is	   not	   about	   nominal	   essences,	   but	   the	   basis	   for	  establishing	  whether	  or	  not	  a	  creature	  is	  human	  does	  indeed	  relate	  to,	  is	  concerned	  with,	   the	   nominal	   essence	   and	   not	   some	   supposed	   real	   essence	   of	   a	   substance.	  Similarly,	   III.v.12	   is	   concerned	   with	   the	   basis	   for	   sorting	   when	   it	   speaks	   of	   the	  patterns	  in	  the	  mind	  to	  which	  ‘we	  referr’	  for	  sorting	  things	  under	  names	  for	  mixed	  modes.	  	   The	   intransitive	   use	   of	   ‘refer’	   in	   II.xxviii.6	   is	   another	   interesting	   example,	  speaking	  of	   the	   ‘Moral	  Rules,	  or	  Laws,	   to	  which	  Men	  generally	  refer,	  and	  by	  which	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they	  judge	  of	  the	  Rectitude	  or	  Pravity	  of	  their	  Actions	  …’.	  The	  context	  supports	  the	  claim	   that	   this	   is	   the	   correlate	   of	   the	   first	   (transitive)	   sense	   of	   ‘refer’	   that	   I	  illustrated,	   ‘to	   submit	   to	   a	  higher	  authority	   for	   consideration’	   (the	  OED	  notes	   that	  this	  has	  an	  intransitive	  use).	  This	  correlated	  sense	  is	  indicated	  by	  surrounding	  texts,	  such	  as	  mention	  of	  ‘[t]he	  Laws	  that	  Men	  generally	  refer	  their	  Actions	  to,	  to	  judge	  of	  their	  Rectitude,	  or	  Obliquity’	  (II.xxviii.7,	  cf.	  4,	  9).	  	   Finally	  we	  can	  come	  back	  to	  Losonsky’s	  argument	  from	  Locke’s	  use	  of	  ‘refer’.	  Losonsky	   cites	   two	   texts.	   In	   one	   of	   these,	   II.xxxi.6,	   Locke	   notes	   that	  when	   people	  suppose	   that	  names	   for	   substances	   ‘stand	   for	  Things,	   as	   supposed	   to	  have	   certain	  real	  Essences	  …	  they	  must	  consequently	  referr	  their	  Ideas	  to	  such	  real	  Essences,	  as	  their	   Archetypes’	   (II.xxxi.6).	   I	   have	   accounted	   for	   this	   (transitive)	   use	   of	   ‘refer’	   in	  terms	   of	   the	  mind	   supposedly	   relating	   a	   complex	   idea	   to	   the	   (here	   unknowable)	  standard	   on	   which	   the	   idea	   is	   modelled.	   In	   the	   second	   text	   we	   do	   have	   an	  intransitive	   use	   (the	   one	   example	   I	   have	  not	   yet	   discussed):	   Locke	   states	   that	   the	  names	  of	  substances	  and	  mixed	  modes	  differ	  in	  that	  ‘those	  of	  mixed	  Modes	  stand	  for	  
Ideas	   perfectly	  arbitrary:	   Those	  of	  Substances,	   are	   not	   perfectly	   so,	   but	   referr	   to	  a	  
pattern’	   (III.iv.17).	  The	  evidence	   I	  have	  cited	  very	  strongly	  suggests	   that	   this	   is	  an	  intransitive	  correlate	  to	  statements	  such	  as	   ‘Our	  complex	  Ideas	  of	  Substances,	  [are]	  …	   referred	   to	   Patterns	   in	   Things	   themselves’	   (II.xxxii.18).	   To	   say	   that	   a	   substance	  word	  refers	  to	  a	  pattern	  is	  to	  say	  that	  the	  word	  should	  be	  traced	  to	  this	  pattern	  if	  we	  wish	  to	  understand	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  complex	  idea	  that	  is	  annexed	  to	  the	  word.	  The	  texts	  Losonsky	  appeals	  to,	  and	  the	  other	  texts	  I	  have	  considered,	  do	  not	  support	  the	  claim	  that	  Locke's	  use	  of	  'refer'	  indicates	  a	  referential	  word-­‐idea	  relation.	  	  
	  
4.2	  Names	  signify	  ideas,	  names	  signify	  things	  	  While	   Locke's	   use	   of	   'refer'	   is	   not	   grounds	   for	   positing	   a	   referential	   word-­‐idea	  relation,	  this	  still	  leaves	  untouched	  the	  second	  part	  of	  Losonsky’s	  argument,	  namely,	  that	  ‘Locke	  does	  state	  quite	  simply	  that	  “Words	  …	  are	  names	  of	  Ideas”	  ’	  (2007:	  310).	  Losonsky	  is	  apparently	  taking	  Locke's	  statement	  as	  an	  indication	  that	  Locke	  took	  an	  idea	  to	  be	  'named'	  when	  a	  word	  is	  used,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  the	  word	  will	  be	  used	  to	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speak	  (in	  part)	  about	   the	  signified	   idea.	  My	  argument	  against	   this	  has	   three	  parts.	  First,	  I	  note	  that	  there	  is	  no	  requirement	  for	  Locke	  to	  treat	  the	  word-­‐idea	  relation	  as	  referential.	  Second,	  evidence	  from	  his	  use	  of	  relational	  terms	  suggests	  that	  he	  kept	  the	   referential	   perspective	   separate	   from	   his	   understanding	   of	   the	   word-­‐idea	  relation.	  While	  this	  points	  away	  from	  a	  referential	   interpretation	  of	   the	  name-­‐idea	  relation,	   some	  aspects	  of	   the	  evidence	  might	  also	   support	   such	  a	   construal.	   In	   the	  third	  part	  of	  the	  argument	  I	  consider	  this,	  but	  conclude	  that	  the	  construal	  remains	  unlikely.	  	   First,	   the	  way	   in	  which	   Locke	   describes	   the	   role	   of	   the	  word-­‐idea	   relation	  does	   not	   require	   that	   this	   relation	   be	   seen	   as	   referential.	   By	   being	   annexed	   to	   an	  idea,	  a	  word	  can	  be	  a	   'sign’	  of	  that	  idea:	  a	  word	  acts	   ‘to	  make	  known	  [the	  signified	  idea]	   to	   others,	   not	   by	   any	   natural	   signification,	   but	   by	   a	   voluntary	   imposition’	  (III.x.5;	   cf.	   III.iv.11).	  For	   this	   to	  happen,	   language	  users	  need	   to	  know	  what	   idea	   is	  affixed	  to	  a	  particular	  word,	  this	  being	  the	  condition	  for	  understanding	  to	  arise:	  	  	   Men	   learn	  Names,	  and	  use	   them	   in	  Talk	  with	  others,	  only	   that	   they	  may	  be	  understood:	   which	   is	   then	   only	   done,	   when	   …	   the	   Sound	   I	   make	   by	   the	  Organs	   of	   Speech,	   excites	   in	   another	   Man’s	   Mind,	   who	   hears	   it,	   the	   Idea	   I	  apply	   it	   to	   in	  mine,	  when	  I	  speak	   it.	   (III.iii.3;	  see	  also	  III.ii.6;	   III.ix.4;	   III.x.29;	  III.xi.25)	  	  The	  requirement	  here	   is	  not	   that	   the	  name	  refers	   to	   the	   idea	  but	   that	   the	  use	  of	  a	  word	  be	  taken	  as	  a	  sign	  that	  the	  hearer	  is	  to	  ‘frame’	  or	  'revive'	  the	  appropriate	  idea	  in	  their	  mind	  (III.iv.12;	  IV.xviii.3).	  It	   is	  uncontroversial	  that	  language	  users	  need	  to	  be	  aware	  of	  and	  process	   the	  meaning	  of	  a	  word	   that	  has	  been	  used,	   so	   this	   is	  not	  relevant	  to	  the	  claim	  of	  semantic	  idealism.	  	  	   A	   referential	   relation	   is,	   though,	   naturally	   seen	   as	   holding	   in	   the	   relation	  between	  words	   and	   things	   that	   arises	  on	   the	  basis	  of	   the	  word-­‐idea	   relation:	   'our	  Words	   signifie	   nothing	   but	   our	   Ideas,	   yet	   [are]	   designed	   by	   them	   [that	   is,	   by	   our	  ideas]	  to	  signifie	  Things'	  (IV.v.8;	  for	  this	  use	  of	  ‘designed’	  cf.	  II.xxx.2).	  Things	  come	  to	  ‘have	  a	  right	  to’	  (III.iii.12)	  or	  to	  be	  ‘intituled	  to’	  (III.vi.5)	  a	  name	  by	  virtue	  of	  agreeing	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with	  the	  signified	   idea,	  and	  we	  ordinarily	  suppose	  that	   it	   is	   to	  such	  things	  that	  we	  use	   the	   word	   to	   refer.	   Notice	   that,	   for	   Locke,	   the	   word-­‐idea	   relation	   is	   not	  established	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   this	   kind	   of	   agreement	   but	   simply	   (in	   an	   envisaged	  original	   naming	   situation)	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   a	   choice:	   Adam	   had	   the	   ‘Liberty	   …	   of	  affixing	   any	   new	  name	   to	   any	   Idea’	   (III.vi.51).	   It	   is	   clear	   that	   Locke	   envisages	   the	  word-­‐idea	  relation	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  quite	  different	  from	  how	  he	  sees	  the	  word-­‐thing	  relation,	  and	  this	   leaves	  open	  the	  possibility	   that	  he	  did	  not	  extend	  the	  referential	  nature	  of	  the	  latter	  into	  his	  understanding	  of	  the	  former.	  	  	   This	  possibility	  is	  strengthened	  by	  looking,	  second,	  at	  a	  notable	  asymmetry	  in	  Locke's	  use	  of	  terminology	  for	  the	  word-­‐idea	  and	  word-­‐thing	  relations.	  It	  is	  true	  that	  Locke	  can	  use	  'signify'	  and	  'stand	  for'	  for	  the	  word-­‐thing	  relation,	  but	  simply	  listing	  these	  texts	  obscures	  the	  huge	  disparity	  in	  the	  frequency	  of	  his	  use	  of	  these	  terms	  for	  the	   word-­‐thing	   relation	   in	   comparison	   with	   the	   word-­‐idea	   relation.	   His	   use	   is	  overwhelmingly	  weighted	  to	  the	  word-­‐idea	  relation.	  In	  Book	  III,	  there	  are	  over	  350	  uses	  of	  these	  terms	  (or	  cognates)	  for	  the	  word-­‐idea	  relation,	  but	  merely	  a	  handful	  of	  texts	   for	   the	   word-­‐thing	   relation	   (and	   sometimes	   these	   are	   uncertain).16	  Locke's	  interest	   in	   'signification'	   relates	   almost	   entirely	   to	   what	   it	   is	   that	   makes	   words	  significant	  (rather	  than	  being	  empty	  sounds)	  and	  his	  answer	  to	  this	  starts	  with	  the	  relation	  between	  a	  word	  and	  an	  idea.17	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  Words	   as	   standing	   for/signifying	   a	   ‘sort’:	   III.i.6;	   III.iii.12;	   III.v.1;	   III.vi.1,	   19,	   25,	   30,	   33;	   III.ix.17;	  III.xi.19.	  Words	  as	  standing	  for/signifying	  (external)	  things:	  III.i.3,	  5;	  III.vi.25,	  39,	  42;	  III.x.4;	  III.xi.24-­‐25.	  There	  are	  scattered	  examples	  in	  the	  other	  books.	  See	  in	  particular	  IV.v.8.	  In	  the	  light	  of	  IV.v.6-­‐9,	  it	  might	  be	  that	  II.xxxii.19;	  IV.v.2,	  5;	  are	  to	  be	  understood	  of	  ideas	  not	  things.	  In	  Books	  I	  and	  II	  there	  are	  about	  fifteen	  examples	  such	  as	  I.iii.19	  ('sin'	  signifies	  ill	  actions),	  II.vii.2	  ('pleasure'	  and	  'pain'	  signify	  'whatsoever	  delights	  or	  molests	  us'),	  II.ix.1	  ('thinking'	  signifies	  an	  operation	  in	  the	  mind).	  The	  force	  of	  some	  of	  these	  is	  debatable	  given	  that	  Locke	  often	  seems	  to	  have	  phrased	  his	  reference	  to	  ideas	  in	  a	  loose	   way	   (see	   e.g.	   III.i.5;	   III.ii.3,	   8;	   III.ix.17;	   IV.viii.6).	   In	   several	   places	   Locke	   criticizes	   the	  supposition	   that	   a	   word	   can	   stand	   for	   or	   signify	   the	   reality	   of	   a	   thing	   or	   the	   real	   essence	   of	   a	  substance	  (II.xxxi.6;	  III.ii.5;	  III.vi.49-­‐50;	  III.ix.12;	  III.x.17-­‐18,	  21,	  32;	  IV.iv.13;	  IV.v.4;	  IV.vi.5,	  8).	  17	  Locke	  describes	  words	  as	   'signs'	  of	   ideas	  but	   it	   is	  difficult	   to	   find	  examples	  where	  he	  describes	  a	  word	  as	  a	  sign	  of	  an	  external	  thing	  (maybe	  II.xxix.10;	  III.x.25).	  For	  an	  'idea'	  as	  a	  sign	  of	  a	  thing,	  see	  IV.xxi.4,	  for	  which	  cf.	  III.iii.11;	  IV.v.2.	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   When	  we	   consider	   the	   terms	  Locke	  more	   typically	   uses	   for	   the	  word-­‐thing	  relation,	  such	  as	  ‘denominate’	  and	  ‘call’,	  we	  find	  the	  opposite:	  these	  terms	  are	  used	  overwhelmingly	   for	   the	   word-­‐thing	   relation	   and	   only	   very	   occasionally	   for	   the	  word-­‐idea	  relation.	  	  	  There	  are	  about	  sixty	  occurrences	  of	   'denominate'	   in	  the	  Essay	   -­‐	  e.g.	   taking	  other	  people's	  property	   is	  denominated	   stealing	   (II.xxviii.16),	   the	  parcel	  of	  matter	  on	  my	  finger	  is	  denominated	  gold	  (II.xxxi.7)	  -­‐	  and	  in	  almost	  every	  case	  it	  is	  only	  the	  item	   that	   a	  word	   refers	   to	   (in	   the	   standard	   sense)	   that	   receives	  denominations.	  A	  word	  such	  as	  'gold'	  is	  used	  to	  denominate	  not	  its	  primary	  signification	  but	  the	  thing	  that	   agrees	  with	   the	   primary	   signification	   (cf.	   II.xi.9;	   II.xxxi.3).	   As	   far	   as	   I	   can	   tell	  there	   are	   only	   three	   places	   where	   'denominate'/'denomination'	   is	   used	   for	   the	  word-­‐idea	  relation.18	  Locke's	  use	  of	   'call'	   is	   similar	   in	   that	   the	   large	  majority	  of	   its	  several	   hundred	   occurrences	   relate	   to	   the	  word-­‐thing	   relation.	  What	  we	   call	   by	   a	  word	   is	   the	  standard	  referent	  of	   the	  word:	  we	  call	   some	   things	   'man,	   'cat',	  parrot'	  (II.xxvii.8),	   other	   things	   'sensible	   qualities'	   (II.i.3),	   other	   things	   'ideas'	   (II.viii.8),19	  and	  so	  on.	  Locke	  does	  use	  ‘call’	  for	  the	  word-­‐idea	  relation	  though	  this	  is	  infrequent	  (I	  return	  to	  this	  below).	  We	  find,	  therefore,	  a	  clear	  difference	  of	  distribution	  between	  'signify'/'stand	  for',	   which	   are	   used	   predominantly	   for	   the	   word-­‐idea	   relation,	   and	  'denominate'/'call',	  which	  are	  used	  predominantly	  for	  the	  word-­‐thing	  relation.20	  	  While	   we	   cannot	   tie	   down	   Locke’s	   use	   of	   words	   into	   neat	   packages,	   the	  overall	  distribution	  shows	  that	  he	  shifted	  terminology	  quite	  dramatically	  away	  from	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  II.xi.14	  (?);	   II.xxiii.6;	   III.v.10.	  At	   II.xxxii.4	  we	  find	  the	  statement	  that	   'Ideas	  themselves	  come	  to	  be	  denominated',	  but	  the	  context	  shows	  that	  this	  is	  elliptical	  for	  'come	  to	  be	  denominated	  true	  or	  false'	  	  (for	  decisive	  parallels	  see	  II.xxxii.1-­‐4,	  and	  for	  the	  ellipsis	  see	  II.xxvi.1).	  	  19	  The	   claim	   is	   not	   that	   ideas	   cannot	   be	   referred	   to	   but	   that	   words	   do	   not	   refer	   to	   their	   primary	  signification.	  Strictly	  speaking,	  by	  'word-­‐thing	  relation'	  I	  mean	  the	  relation	  between	  a	  word	  and	  what	  the	  word	  would	   standardly	   be	   taken	   as	   referring	   to,	  which	   for	   a	   phrase	   such	   as	   'idea	   of	   gold'	   can	  include	  ideas.	  20	  A	   few	   other	   terms	   are	   used	   (infrequently)	   for	   both	   relations:	   ‘apply	   to’	   (III.ii.3;	   III.iii.2),	   ‘design’	  (II.xxix.7;	   III.vi.30),	   ‘mark’	   (III.ii.2;	   III.i.3),	   ‘comprehend	   under’	   (III.vi.21;	   IV.vi.4),	   ‘express’	   (III.ii.3;	  III.vi.33).	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‘signify’	  or	   ‘stand	  for’,	  and	  towards	   ‘call’	  or	   ‘denominate’,	  when	  discussing	  the	  type	  of	  relation	  for	  which	  a	  referential	  claim	  is	  most	  natural.	  This	  suggests	  that	   'signify'	  may	   not	   have	   carried	  with	   it,	   for	   Locke,	   a	   strong	   correlation	  with	   the	   referential	  perspective.	   Locke's	   discussion	   of	   signification	   starts	   with	   the	   relation	   between	  words	  and	  ideas,	  and	  the	  primary	  focus	  in	  this	  discussion	  is	  on	  what	  makes	  words	  (which	   are	   otherwise	   just	   empty	   sounds)	   'significant'.	   This	   is	   a	   broader	   question	  than	  that	  of	  reference.	  Given	  that	  words	  are	  significant	  they	  can	  be	  used	  in	  relation	  to	  external	  things,	  and	  Locke	  extends	  ‘signify’	  –	  though	  it	  is	  not	  much	  more	  than	  an	  occasional	   echo	   -­‐	   to	   this	   word-­‐thing	   relation.	   To	   project	   a	   referential	   aspect	   into	  Locke’s	  view	  of	   the	  word-­‐idea	  relation	  on	   the	  basis	  of	  his	  use	  of	   ‘signify’	   seems	  as	  little	   justified	   as	  would	  be,	   on	   that	   same	  basis,	   to	   project	   the	   ‘affixed,	   annexed	   to’	  aspect	   of	   the	   word-­‐idea	   relation	   into	   his	   view	   of	   the	   word-­‐thing	   relation.	  Words	  connect	  to	  ideas	  and	  can	  be	  used	  to	  refer	  to	  things.	  Locke’s	  use	  of	  ‘signify’	  does	  not	  undermine	  this	  distinction.	  Evidence	   from	   the	   distribution	   of	   terminology	   does	   though	   cut	   in	   two	  directions.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   as	   just	   discussed,	   it	   suggests	   that	   there	   is	   no	   strong	  pressure	   to	   construe	   the	   claim	   that	   words	   signify	   ideas	   in	   a	   referential	   way.	  Describing	   a	   word	   as	   a	   ‘name’	   of	   an	   idea	   need	   only	   be	   taken	   to	   indicate	   that,	   in	  virtue	  of	  the	  idea	  being	  annexed	  to	  it,	  the	  name	  can	  be	  used	  as	  a	  sign	  of	  (as	  standing	  for,	  signifying)	  the	  idea	  in	  the	  non-­‐referential	  sense	  described	  above.	  	  On	   the	   other	   hand,	   Locke	   does,	   as	  mentioned,	   occasionally	   use	   'call'	   when	  describing	   the	   word-­‐idea	   relation.	   For	   example,	   he	   speaks	   of	   'that	   complex	   Idea	  which	  I,	  or	  any	  one	  else	  calls	  Gold'	  (III.vi.19),	  of	  the	  'complex	  Idea	  which	  is	  called	  a	  
Man'	   (IV.viii.6).21	  Here	   we	   have	   a	   phrasing	   and	   a	   terminology	   that	   appears	   to	  support	  the	  claim	  that	  Locke	  supposes	  that	  when	  we	  use	  a	  word	  such	  as	   'man'	  we	  are	  (in	  part)	  speaking	  about	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  word	  ‘man’	  signifies	  –	  an	  idea	  that	  we	  call	  by	  that	  name.	  Further,	  there	  are	  a	  few	  passages	  where	  Locke	  could	  be	  seen	  as	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  The	   following	   is	   a	   fairly	   comprehensive	   list	   of	  passages	  where	   similar	  phrasing	  occurs:	   II.xviii.3;	  II.xix.1;	   II.xx.4;	   II.xxi.1;	   II.xxii.9;	   II.xxvi.1;	   II.xxix.6;	   11;	   II.xxxi.2,	   9;	   II.xxxii.5,	   9,	   10,	   15,	   25;	   III.vi.44;	  III.x.32,	  33;	  IV.i.4;	  IV.iii.19;	  IV.iv.9;	  IV.vii.12,	  13,	  16-­‐18;	  IV.viii.12;	  IV.xi.2,	  9.	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actually	  implementing	  this	  in	  his	  use	  of	  language.	  He	  can	  write:	  '[T]he	  Idea	  which	  an	  
English-­‐man	  signifies	  by	  the	  Name	  Swan,	  is	  white	  Colour,	  long	  Neck,	  red	  Beak,	  black	  Legs,	  and	  whole	  Feet	   ...'	   (II.xxiii.14;	  see	  also	  II.xxvi.1;	  IV.vi.9,	  15;	  IV.vii.12;	  IV.viii.6).	  The	   phrasing	   appears	   incongruous,	   but	   the	   suggestion	   would	   be	   that	   this	   is	   an	  example	   of	   Locke	   actually	   using	   words	   as	   the	   semantic	   idealist	   construal	   of	   his	  theory	  would	  predict:	  by	  'long	  neck'	  he	  means	  (in	  part)	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  long	  neck,	  and	  so	  on.	   I	  do	  not	   think,	   though,	   that	   these	  passages,	   coupled	  with	   the	  description	  of	  words	   as	   names	   of	   ideas,	   provide	   strong	   enough	   grounds	   to	  make	   the	   referential	  construal	  of	  the	  word-­‐idea	  relation	  likely.	  The	  texts	  I	  have	  isolated	  do	  not	  form	  part	  of	   a	   clearly	   marked	   theme	   in	   the	   Essay.	   They	   are	   rather	   anonymous	   and	   seem	  merely	  to	  be	  casual	  (and	  sometimes	  confused)	  variants	  embedded	  within	  the	  text.	  If	  these	   are	   indications	   that	  Locke	   thought	  of	   the	  word-­‐idea	   relation	   in	   a	   referential	  way,	  they	  are	  infrequent	  and	  lack	  saliency.	  There	  are	  more	  systematic	  parts	  of	  the	  Essay	  in	  which	  Locke	  agrees	  that	  we	  can,	  in	  some	  circumstances,	  speak	  of	  ideas	  by	  using	  the	  names	  of	  ideas,	  but	  this	  is	  an	  observation	   about	   a	   few	   unusual	   contexts	   of	   language	   use.22	  In	   his	   discussion	   of	  'trifling	   propositions'	   (IV.viii)	   Locke	   suggests	   that	   there	   are	   various	   types	   of	  proposition	  that,	  while	  appearing	  (in	  form)	  to	  convey	  an	  increase	  in	  knowledge,	  are	  in	  reality	  merely	  about	  the	  ideas	  signified	  by	  the	  words	  used	  (as	  happens,	  he	  says,	  when	  a	  predicate	   signifies	   an	   idea	   that	   is	   already	  part	  of	   the	   idea	   signified	  by	   the	  subject	   term,	   IV.viii.5).	   Locke	   treats	   such	   propositions	   as	   a	   misuse	   of	   words:	   a	  person	   'trifles	  with	  Words,	  who	  makes	  such	  a	  Proposition',	  and	   they	  add	  up	   to	  no	  more	  than	  when	  a	  person	  'goes	  to	  explain	  his	  Terms,	  to	  one	  who	  is	  supposed	  ...	  not	  to	   understand	   him'	   (IV.viii.7).	   Locke's	   discussion	   suggests	   that,	   apart	   from	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  A	  different	   type	  of	   case	  occurs	  when	  discussing	  knowledge.	   Locke	   speaks	   in	   terms	  of	   the	   'ideas'	  that	  our	  mind	  is	  'employed	  about',	  these	  being	  the	  materials	  we	  operate	  on	  in	  our	  thinking	  (II.i.1-­‐2;	  II.xi.4,	  6;	  II.xii.8;	  II.xxv.9;	  IV.xvii.10).	  In	  this	  context,	  Locke	  does	  sometimes	  speak	  of	  the	  ideas	  that	  a	  proposition	  is	   'about'	  but	  the	  perspective	  is	  not	  referential.	  Rather,	   it	   is	  an	  indication	  of	  what	   ideas	  the	  mind	  will	  be	  operating	  on	  in	  coming	  to	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  proposition	  and	  in	  assessing	  it	  for	  truth	  or	  falsity	  (see	  especially	  I.ii.23;	  also	  I.ii.12,	  15-­‐16;	  IV.vii.4,	  15;	  IV.xi.14).	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statements	   that	   are	   explicitly	   about	   terms,	   it	   is	   only	   some	   degenerate	   types	   of	  statement	   that	   should	   be	   taken	   as	   about	   signified	   ideas	   and	   these	   types	   ought,	   at	  least	  in	  many	  cases,	  to	  be	  avoided.23	  	  In	   conclusion,	   I	   do	   not	   think	   that	   the	   evidence	   appealed	   to	   by	   Losonsky	   is	  good	  enough	  to	  support	  the	  claim	  that	  Locke	  held	  to	  a	  degree	  of	  semantic	  idealism.	  Without	  adequate	  further	  support,	  the	  description	  of	  a	  word	  as	  a	  'name'	  of	  the	  idea	  to	   which	   it	   is	   annexed	   cannot	   be	   taken	   as	   indicating	   that	   use	   of	   the	   word	  referentially	  names	  the	  idea.	  Because	  a	  word	  names	  an	  idea	  a	  word	  can	  be	  used	  as	  a	  sign	  of	  an	  idea,	  but	  this	  is	  understood	  by	  Locke	  in	  terms	  of	  language	  users	  realizing	  that	  the	  idea	  to	  which	  the	  name	  is	  annexed	  needs	  to	  be	  revived	  in	  the	  mind.	  Locke's	  general	   use	   of	   words,	   and	   the	   differences	   in	   how	   he	   envisages	   the	   word-­‐idea	  relation	   in	   comparison	  with	   the	  word-­‐thing	   relation,	   provide	   good	   evidence	   for	   a	  non-­‐referential	  reading.24	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